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1 Introduction 
From 1982 to 2002, the price of steel changed on average only 4% yearly; over the three years 
2002 to 2005, steel prices skyrocketed 50% (1). Price swings  like these throughout the raw 
materials sector have placed a renewed spotlight on the implications that raw materials can have 
on a firm and supply chain operations.  
The importance of raw materials is obvious to those stakeholders that operate upstream (Figure 
1) extracting, refining, and processing material into products; such stakeholders are intimately 
aware of the vagaries of material supply and prices. However, it is critical that all stakeholders 
become aware of the potential impact of raw material supplies on their business. If those raw 
materials become difficult to acquire, market forces may shift demand to other goods and 
therefore other supply chains.  
Irrespective of one’s specific business, such shifts can lead to irreparable economic harm. 
Unfortunately, the post facto responses available to firms are limited by the far-reaching effects 
of materials. Materials are not simply a bundle of characteristics that translate into product 
performance. Instead, on the operational side, materials establish a class of appropriate 
production technologies and, by extension, possible product forms and architecture. From the 
perspective of supply chain management, materials dictate the set of possible suppliers and, 
therefore, the distribution of supply chain nodes. The extent of these effects means that soley 
reactive response will be limited and may be ineffective.  
 
Figure 1: Supply chain diagram from upstream raw material manufacturer to downstream retail and reverse 
supply chain which includes disposal and recycling. 
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In light of this, supply chain stakeholders, should be aware of the stresses that supply chains 
place on materials use and the vulnerability of the supply base for that material to change. The 
question of materials availability is an issue that has been addressed many times over the past 
200 years by scientists, engineers and economists, and it is an issue with many levels of 
complexity. This document examines the question of materials vulnerability, or conversely 
materials availability, from the perspective of a supply chain decision-maker. Specifically, it 
addresses four elements of this question: 
• Outcomes: What types of changes can be observed in supply chains as a result of limited 
materials availability? 
• Mechanisms: What can cause supply chains to face limited raw materials availability? 
• Metrics: How can supply chain decision-makers screen for materials availability 
vulnerability? 
• Strategies: How can supply chains adapt to become more resilient to potential limited 
materials availability? 
This paper, through the use of detailed case analyses, suggests that there are specific outcomes – 
technological, operational, and geographic – which can be expected within supply chains when 
limitations on materials emerge and that at least two mechanisms can drive limited access to 
materials. These results are complemented with an examination of metrics to diagnose 
vulnerability and a preliminary discussion of preventative prescriptions for the supply chain.  
1.1 An Overview of Issues for the Supply Chain 
To understand how supply chain policy-making may be altered by awareness of materials 
constraints, it is first necessary to characterize both the impact that such constraints can have on 
supply-chain operations (outcomes) and the mechanisms by which these constraints are realized. 
Although the details of these will be explored subsequently, they are summarized here to provide 
the context from which their symptoms and prevention emerge. 
1.1.1 Outcomes from Limited Materials Availability 
There are at least three types of outcomes that may result from a material shortage:  
1. Technological: Supply chain stakeholders may redesign their products to use less or 
substitute materials.  
2. Geographic: The upstream supply chain may reconfigure to tap into new sources 
3. Operational: Downstream firms may alter inventory practices or work to recover 
alternative materials streams.   
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The supply-chain for the residential construction industry provides a clear and easily accessible 
case that demonstrates all three of these effects. Lumber shortages in the U.S. Northeast, in part 
due to the booming housing industry, have resulted in increasing costs of lumber (NY Times 
(2)). To some extent, construction companies have passed on the costs to customers. However, 
some firms have adapted to these changes by exploring other technological options, including 
engineered wood, steel studs, and reinforced concrete. Options for alternative sources, Canada, 
were limited due to government-imposed quotas. Interestingly, as recent prices for other 
materials have risen (most notably steel), construction firms are moving back away from those 
substitutes (3). Clearly, those firms with the skill to make use of other material options were 
better positioned to deal with these fluctuations in material prices. 
The effects of materials availability on the construction industry supply chain are very visible 
because of the large tonnages (4) and the high degree of technological substitutability1. However, 
all product supply chains are vulnerable to materials availability problems, but not all firms have 
configured their technological and operational options to adapt to these vulnerabilities.  
1.1.2 Mechanisms that Drive Availability Risk 
Based on the case presented in the next section and review of the literature, there appear to be at 
least two prominent mechanisms that can create materials availability risk. This document 
proposes that one mechanism – institutional or structural efficiency – exists that can be 
expected to trigger adverse supply chain outcomes. Institutional inefficiency has been largely 
overlooked in the traditional analysis of materials availability due to its ephemeral nature.  
However, although the disruption may be short-term, it may result in permanent and significant 
changes to the supply chain and the patterns of materials use that it supports.  
The second mechanism,  physical limitation or constraint, has been the focus of the economics 
and environmental literature around materials availability (5-10). Conceptually, a material is 
considered physically scarce when there is a risk of “running out”. More generally, physical 
constraint concerns involve apprehension that long term world demand will exceed world 
supply.  
                                                 
1 Successful firms offering substitutes to softwood lumber go to great length to make their products compatible with 
traditional construction methods. Any deviation from this is addressed through extensive education to overcome 
barriers to adoption ((3) Garth, J.; Eastin, I.; Edelson, J.; CINTRAFOR, 2004.). 
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2 Historical Case Study:  
Global outcomes from decreased availability of cobalt in the 1970’s2 
Historically, no documented case of significant global material depletion has occurred. 
Nevertheless, supply chains have been impacted by specific examples of materials availability 
during the 20th century3. This section examines one such case, the use of cobalt, , to better 
understand how materials can affect supply chains and to suggest how to identify vulnerability to 
such risks.  
2.1 Overview of the Case4 
Cobalt has always been a material with a volatile price. In fact, from 1966 to 1976 and from 
1980 to 2002, the year-to-year price changes of cobalt were as high as 41%. However, even these 
levels of variability were small compared to the shock felt by the market in the late 1970’s. 
Between 1977 and 1979, the price of cobalt increased 380%, climbing from $5.20/lbs to $25/lbs 
($11440/t to $55000/t). The price spike occurred following a rebellion in Zaire5, a country which 
at the time represented only 0.04% of world population and 0.009% of global GDP (17). This 
                                                 
2 Information on historical events and data for this section were taken from the following references and sources: 
(11) Natural Resources Canada, 1886-2004.,  
(12) U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Department of the Interior, 1932-2006., 
(13) Blechman, B. M.; Sloss, D. National security and strategic minerals : an analysis of U.S. 
dependence on foreign sources of cobalt; Westview Press: Boulder, 1985., 
(14) Odorn, L. C. T. P.; Institute, C. S., Ed.; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993., 
(15) Adelman, K. L. The Royal African Society, Oxford University Press 1978, 77, 36-44..  
3 Many of the examples of materials availability disruptions occurred due to intentional and punitive actions of 
nations. For example, copper availability in the U.S. was closely linked to policies during the wars of the 20th 
century. For more details see Appendix A in (16) Jolly, J. L.; 4th ed. ed.; Copper Development Association Inc.: 
New York, 2005; p 78. 
4 A timeline of the events linked to the “Cobalt Crisis” can be found in the Additional Resources Section (URL 
dspace). 
5 Zaire is today named the Democratic Republic of Congo 
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price swing squeezed numerous global supply chains. In response, products, production 
technologies, sourcing routes, and even national policies were changed.  
To explore this example more fully this section will give a background on the cobalt market, 
describes the events surrounding the “Cobalt Crisis”, and discusses the outcomes within the 
materials supply chain.   
2.2 Background: cobalt sources and applications 
To many, cobalt sounds like an exotic metal with limited practical value. However, cobalt was 
and is used in a broad array of products for both commercial and consumer applications (Table 
2). In the early 1970’s, 40% of world land-based cobalt reserves6 were located in Zaire. 
Consequently, Zaire and neighboring Zambia controlled about 2/3 of world production. The 
major mines were located in the Shaba province (cf. Figure 2) with the Benguela railway, which 
passed through Angola, representing the main transport path for cobalt export.  
                                                 
6 Reserves, as defined by the USGS, incorporates economic and identified ore bodies: (12) U.S. Geological 
Survey; U.S. Department of the Interior, 1932-2006.. 
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Benguela 
Railway 
 
Figure 2: Map of cobalt-producing region of Zaire. Source:  
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/maps/92449.gif (12). 
During this period, the U.S. was the main world cobalt consumer and produced no primary 
cobalt domestically. One single dealer, African Meta Corps (AMC), supplied all Zairian cobalt to 
the U.S.  
2.3 Political events surrounding the “Cobalt Crisis” 
Following World War II, the U.S. recognized the strategic importance of cobalt to a number of 
defense related applications and began to stockpile cobalt as a part of the strategic materials 
reserve. . From the late 1940’s, up until 1973, the U.S. kept a defense stockpile that was about 2 
times its yearly commercial consumption. The actual stockpile inventory at the end of 1973 was 
of 63Mlbs, the U.S. yearly consumption was 18Mlbs. In 1973, the U.S. decided to decrease its 
stockpile goal to 11.9Mlbs and to start selling cobalt to U.S. consumers.   
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Political instability in the region was of concern in 1975, when the Benguela railway was closed 
due to a civil war in Angola. As a result, a longer route had to be taken and consumer concern 
led to increases in consumer stocks. Nevertheless, the supply disruption of cobalt from the 
downstream supply chain viewpoint was limited because sales from the U.S. defense stockpile 
continued to supply U.S. cobalt needs. 
Continued uncertainty in the region led AMC in 1976 to apply temporary limits to its U.S. cobalt 
shipments to 125% of previous 15 months shipments. The U.S. government, concerned with 
cobalt source instability and defense needs, decided to restock its defense stockpile and set a new 
goal of 85.4Mlbs. Sales were ceased from defense stockpiles with stockpile inventory at 41Mlbs. 
In addition, in 1977, there was an increase in U.S. commercial aircraft engine production and in 
gas-well drilling leading to increases in U.S. cobalt consumption. Still, prices from 1975 to end 
of 1976 only rose from $4 to $5.40 ($8800/t to $11880/t).  
In March 1977, a first invasion of the Shaba province by about 1500 rebels occurred. The 
invasion lasted for 80 days and although no major cities were overtaken, operations were 
disrupted in a manganese mine site in Western Shaba.  
A second invasion occurred in May 1978, with 5000 insurgents taking over parts of the Shaba 
province. They cut the main power line to all mining facilities in the Kolwezi area of the Shaba 
province. Also, emergency power supplying the Kamoto mine, an underground mine in the 
region, was cut, leading to flooding of the mine. About 200 of the 2500 European expatriates 
(many of whom were mining expert contractors) were killed and the remaining were evacuated.  
Overall, the insurgents were in Zaire for about 2 weeks. Electrical power to the mines was lost 
for a total of 5 days. Due to flooding and the evacuation of most expert contractors, the mines in 
the area were slow to restore operation and the Kamoto mine was unable to return to full 
capacity for 2 months. Despite all of these issues, Zaire managed to produce more cobalt in 1978 
than the average yearly production for the years 1975 to 1977. 
However, during this same time period, there was a global economic upturn that led to increased 
demand for many primary commodities, including cobalt. This, concern for supply shortages, 
along with real delays in transporting cobalt out to Western countries, led to consumer panic 
buying and speculation. In the months following the invasion there was a dramatic price increase 
of cobalt. In February 1979, the price of cobalt hit $25/lbs ($55000/t) with dealer prices reported 
at $45/lbs ($99000/t). Prices remained high until 1982 (cf. Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Historical cobalt average yearly prices and primary production 1950-2000 (12). 
2.4 Outcomes of the “Cobalt Crisis” 
During the period of high cobalt prices, interest in reducing the world’s vulnerability to cobalt 
price volatility led cobalt supply chain stakeholders and consuming country governments to act. 
Emphasis here will be one the supply chain responses.  
2.4.1 Upstream responses 
One set of outcomes was initiated upstream, by raw material manufacturers. Short-term efforts 
concentrated on improving the lead times that had increased due to the political disturbance. This 
included transporting some of the cobalt out of the region by air to major world markets.   
Longer-term efforts in Zaire were aimed at stabilizing and expanding existing mining operations 
primarily through the assistance of loans obtained from the World Bank and the Libyan Arab 
Bank. Zambia, Zaire’s neighbor and the world’s second largest primary cobalt producer, 
increased its production capacity by adding to its refining capacity and by improving recovery 
techniques. A new refinery was opened in Zambia in December 1979 and further increased 
capacity was expected for 1984.  
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The U.S. mining companies considered their own resources, including the re-commissioning the 
defunct Black Bird mine in Idaho and ocean floor nickel-manganese nodules. Most effective was 
the increase in recycling efforts, resulting in a doubling of cobalt recovery after 19787.  
In the short term, the search for new primary sources of cobalt did not lead to a large change in 
the importance of Zaire’s mining operations; but it did change the location of refining to 
neighboring Zambia (cf. Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Cobalt prices and changes in Zaire’s market share of cobalt supply (12). 
In the long term, the U.S. did not pursue any options to increase domestic production since the 
drop in prices in the 1980’s made domestic mining uneconomic. Nevertheless, other changes did 
occur that reduced the importance of Zaire’s mining of cobalt. Specifically, both Zambia and 
Australia dramatically increased their primary production capacity such that by 2004, Zaire only 
accounted for 31% of world mined cobalt. (cf. Table 1). 
                                                 
7 Secondary materials can be viewed as an alternate source of raw material – rather than turning to additional 
sources of ore, the cobalt supply chain turned to secondary sources in the form or recycling. An interesting aspect of 
secondary materials is that the source location is usually near the consumption location and therefore changing from 
primary materials to secondary materials is a mode of source relocation. 
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Table 1: Cobalt primary production geographic distribution (12). 
Country Market Share in 
1975 (%) 
Country Market Share in 
2004 (%) 
Zaire 47.6 Congo (formerly Zaire) 30.5 
Australia 9.2 Zambia 19.1 
Zambia 8.1 Australia 12.8 
New Caledonia 7.0 Canada 9.9 
Morocco 6.8 Cuba 6.9 
 
2.4.2 Downstream responses 
Another set of outcomes emerged downstream in the supply chain, when component and product 
manufacturers reevaluated their production options in light of the price increases. The specific 
changes in cobalt consumption patterns are outlined in Table 2.  
In the magnetic applications of cobalt, Alnico, an aluminum, nickel, cobalt alloy was the alloy of 
choice before 1978. Rare-earth-cobalt magnets were already being developed and showed great 
promise in replacing Alnico because they were stronger and used less material. (Minerals 
Yearbook 1977 (12)). When prices did spike, substitution to rare-earth-cobalt occurred quickly in 
the magnet industry in applications with limitations on weight, size and energy.  
Reduction of cobalt use in superalloys for the aerospace industry was more difficult because of 
limited available substitutes and because there was increased demand for jet engines. In the short 
term, cobalt consumption in the transportation industry increased, with only some substitution to 
nickel-based alloys. Nevertheless, some savings in cobalt use were attained with development of 
a recycling process for using scrap superalloy.  
Some substitution to iron-based and nickel-based alloys also occurred in cobalt cutting tools, 
however, overall machinery end-use of cobalt increased slightly. Reduction in cobalt 
consumption in ceramics and paints also occurred, likely because substitution in these 
applications was easy.  
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Table 2: Changes in cobalt uses from 1975 to 1981 (Appendix B, Table B-3 (13)). 
1975-1977 average 1978 1979-1981 average Cobalt 
Consumption 
End-Use  
Quantity 
(Mlbs) % 
Quantity 
(Mlbs) % 
Quantity 
(Mlbs) % 
Transportation 3.5 30 4.6 23 5.8 36 
Electrical 4.4 20 4.6 23 2.8 17 
Machinery 2.9 17 3.3 16 3.0 19 
Paints 2.7 16 3.8 19 2.1 13 
Chemicals 1.6 9 2.2 11 1.7 11 
Ceramics 1.8 10 1.6 8 0.6 4 
Other 0.5 3 0.3 1 0.2 1 
Total 17.4  20.4  16.1  
 
2.5 Summary: lessons learned 
Cobalt was selected for this case study because it is pointed example of the range of outcomes 
that can result for supply-chains as a result of material availability disruptions. In particular, as 
prices rose, the supply-chain responsed through.  
• materials substitution and development of new technology 
• source relocation 
• hoarding and rationing 
• supply mode changes 
Some supply chain responses reduced and while others increased the negative effects of the 
supply disruptions.  
• Downstream supply chain efforts were generally positive. Consumption of primary cobalt 
was decreased by material substitution and increased recycling. 
• Upstream supply chain efforts to find new sources of cobalt were not particularly fruitful. 
However, relocation of cobalt refineries to neighboring Zambia insulated parts of the 
supply chain (especially employees) from political instability 
•  Imposed ration allocations by the sole Zairian cobalt supplier only increased market 
uncertainly and possibly extended the length of the disruptions.   
• Although, the U.S. government held stockpiles of cobalt and was an important second 
source of cobalt, it could not continue supplying the U.S. market in the long term. The 
government’s decision to stop sales from the stockpile and restock in 1976 resulted in a 
sudden decrease of domestic supply and increase of demand, resulting in a sudden change 
of the cobalt market. 
• Supply chain managers decisions to change transportation path improved lead times in 
the short-term.  
The events surrounding the supply disruption highlight the factors that influence materials 
vulnerability to institutional inefficiency. Three issues increased the effect of the disruption: 
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• poor geographic distribution of sources  
• monopsony market conditions and 
• lack of substitutions for critical applications, in this case defense-related applications 
A large aspect of the price spike was based on speculation, related to the fact that Zaire alone 
controlled such a large part of the global primary cobalt market. The factors that influenced 
cobalt vulnerability may serve as indicators of the possibility for institutional inefficiency. These 
metrics will be covered in detail in the next section. 
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3 Identifying and Measuring Vulnerability to Availability Problems 
The first key challenge for supply chain decision-makers is identifying vulnerable elements of 
their own supply chains. To begin to address this question, this section describes a range of 
metrics that provide insight into materials market vulnerabilities.  
Of course, the use of any metric carries with it a host of assumptions that require careful 
scrutiny.  The reduction of a complex circumstance to a single number necessarily depends upon 
a simplified abstraction that is limited by the assumptions used to devise the model.  While no 
single metric can capture the complexity of reality, the careful application of metrics can 
generate important insights into not only where problems might be expected to emerge, but also 
where concern need not be quite so intense. 
The following figure (cf. Figure 5) illustrates much of the complexity confronting the constructor 
of resource scarcity metrics. 
 
Figure 5: Flow analysis for materials availability. Key drivers of scarcity/availability are indicated by rates. 
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The figure depicts the materials economy as a network of resource flows, driven by a 
consumption rate deriving from the demand for applications that use the resource, and moderated 
by the availability of substitutes and recycling rates.  Underlying much of this dynamic are 
market notions, not only in terms of the segregation between resource and reserves8, but also in 
terms of the way in that resource prices will influence demand, substitution and recycling rates.  
The figure suggests that, when constructing a metric of scarcity, there are a host of competing 
rates, which can also be viewed as “drivers of availability,” that have to be assessed against the 
amount of extracted and as-yet unextracted resource: 
• resource discovery,  
• technological change in extraction9 
• consumption,  
• substitution, 
• recycling, and  
• loss  
                                                 
8 Geologists subdivide primary sources of metals by how well they have been identified and measured and by how 
economic and technically viable it is to extract them today. USGS reports global estimates of  reserves, reserve base 
and resources, defined as follows: 
The reserves incorporate all ore bodies that are economically and technically viable to extract. The reserve base 
incorporates reserves, but also includes ore for which extraction is marginally economic and demonstrated 
subeconomic with present prices and technologies. The resources include the reserve base and the rest of the 
subeconomic deposits as well as estimates of the quantity of metal that have not yet been properly measured. 
(reference:(12) U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Department of the Interior, 1932-2006.)  
The resource base includes all metal content in the earth’s crust (to a certain depth) and oceans, at all 
concentrations. (reference: chapter 3 of (18) Tilton, J. E. On borrowed time? : assessing the threat of mineral 
depletion; Resources for the Future: Washington, DC, 2003.) 
9 We use the term “technological change in extraction” to include technological developments in the production of a 
given metal that can result in improved access to the metal and thus reduced cost of extraction. In decreasing the 
cost of extraction, the size of the reserves is increased without an increase in the price of the metal. 
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None of these rates can be considered fixed, and all are strongly influenced by market and other 
forces.  
The most fundamental question of metric construction is “what does it mean for a resource to be 
‘scarce’?  We have proposed (Section 1.1.2) two mechanisms that result in materials scarcity: 
• institutional inefficiency: failures by markets, firms and governments can result in a set of 
immediate circumstances of resource unavailability 
• physical constraints: the amount and quality of a resource is physically determined and 
ultimately limits materials availability  
The cobalt case in the preceding section illustrates how scarcity can arise from purely 
institutional mechanisms --- in that case, a local disruption of supply that led to a global market 
disruption.  More conventional notions of scarcity can be traced at least as far back as the 
writings of Thomas Malthus (19). In his presentation, scarcity arises from physical constraints on 
resource availability, occurring when extraction results in a complete exhaustion of resources. In 
the early 19th century, economist David Ricardo refined this notion of physical constraints, based 
on the observation that resources exist in different levels of quality.  Because high quality 
resources will be extracted before lower quality ones, scarcity is not merely a consequence of 
resource exhaustion, but instead derives from the increasing difficulty and cost of accessing 
lower quality resources (20).  A resource, then, becomes “scarce” when effort needed to access 
the marginal amount of material is greater than the amount of effort one would be capable of or 
willing to exert. 
Given these perspectives on the mechanisms underlying the notion of scarcity, the metrics 
presented in this report are classified as either: 
• Strict measures of institutional efficiency 
• Strict measures of physical constraints: Malthusian metrics, or 
• Measures of physical constraints mediated by institutional efficiency: Ricardian metrics 
3.1 Institutional inefficiency metrics 
As the cobalt case study demonstrates, short-term problems, even in isolated areas of the world, 
can result in global disruptions to the supply of a material. Some scarcity metrics  that derive 
from notions of  institutional efficiency are outlined in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Measures of institutional efficiency. 
Metrics and 
Indicators 
Description Source 
Geographic 
Structure based on 
Supply (%) 
Distribution of reserve size in top countries 
Assumption: supply diversity increases efficiency 
Geographic 
Structure based on 
Production (%) 
Distribution of production in top producing 
countries 
Assumption: supply diversity increases efficiency 
(21) 
Institutional 
Structure based on 
Production (%) 
Distribution of control by most important company 
Assumption: supply diversity increases efficiency 
(22) 
Institutional 
Structure based on 
Consumption (%) 
Distribution of applications and companies that 
consume a given material, identification of new uses 
of the material 
Assumption: demand diversity increases efficiency 
 
Recycling Rate 
(%) 
 = (old + new scrap)/total consumption, or old 
scrap/total 
Assumption: reliance upon recycled resource 
increases efficiency; greater confidence in supply 
(12,23) 
Old Scrap 
Availability 
(unitless) 
 Availability = old scrap generated/total 
consumption 
Assumption: reliance upon recycled resource 
increases efficiency; greater confidence in supply 
(23,24)    
Economic Metric: 
Market price ($) 
Time trend and volatility of price.   
Assumption: efficient markets 
(9,25) 
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The most broadly-cited measures of vulnerability to institutional inefficiency focus on 
concentration within the supply-chain. Chapman and Roberts examine concentration from a 
national perspective, while McClements and Cranswick looked at concentration at a firm level.  
In the cobalt case, the structure, both geographic and industrial, of supply and demand affected 
short term material availability. Generally, the geographic distribution of reserves depends on the 
geophysics of the earth’s crust, past depletion and present exploration. Consequently, resource 
distribution is uneven and, in most cases, extraction is concentrated in a small number of 
countries. In and of itself, this is not a problem. However, in the face of uncertain external 
factors (such as political events, natural disaster, or institutional responses to market structure), 
concentrations in resource availability make that resource more susceptible to institutional 
inefficiency and supply disruptions (21). Likewise, oligopsonistic resource markets are more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in demand, leading to market volatility. 
In 1975, 45% of world primary cobalt was produced in Zaire. Cobalt was not uniquely 
positioned in terms of the geographic distribution of its production (Figure 6a). However, at a 
45% share, actions by a few institutions in the face of political disturbances had a global impact 
on the cobalt market. 
While metal production is more evenly distributed around the world today (Figure 6b), platinum 
and magnesium appear to be highly vulnerability to institutional inefficiency because, in both 
cases, a single country accounts for more than 70% of global production. Moreover, while 
magnesium resources are evenly distributed around the world, more than 80% of present 
platinum reserves are found in South Africa (12).  
Copper, lithium and tin exhibit an intermediate, but noteworthy level of vulnerability, in that 
each has between 35 and 45% of their primary production concentrated in a single country. 
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Figure 6: Geographic distribution of primary production for various metals. Top three producing countries 
for each metal in a. 1975 and b. 2004.(12) 
An examination of the availability of secondary sources yields  another perspective on supply-
chain concentration. In the cobalt case, recycling became an important supply source. Recycling 
rate can be an indicator of the importance of scrap as a resource (12). Thus, higher recycling 
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rates can be an indicator of lower vulnerability. Moreover, high recycling rates in countries with 
high consumption rates often indicate lower dependence on imported metal since scrap is often 
collected locally.  
Recycling rate data is readily available for the U.S. and can also be found (or derived) for many 
other countries (cf. Table 4). Lead, which is easily recovered from its predominant application in 
lead-acid batteries, has the highest recycling rate. Zinc, on the other hand, has a low recycling 
rate because many of its uses are dissipative.  
Recycling rate does not reflect the quantity of metal being discarded at end-of-life, which is 
treated by the secondary availability metric used by Ayres et al. (24). Availability limits 
recycling rate if the amount of metal reaching end-of-life is much smaller than demands for that 
metal. This has been suggested for copper, which has experienced exponential consumption 
growth rates (24,26).  
In the end, materials with high levels of concentration in primary production should be less 
vulnerable to scarcity arising from institutional inefficiency if there is an active secondary 
recovery industry.  
Table 4: Recycling rates for a few important metals. 
 Global Recycling Rate (1999) 
(27) 
U.S. Recycling Rate (average 
2000-2004) (12) 
Aluminum 29% 36% 
Copper 35% 31% 
Lead 55% 79% 
Nickel >40% 40% 
Steel >50% 56% 
Zinc >18% 26% 
 
The final metric of institutional inefficiency listed in Table 3 is the market price of the 
commodity of interest. As a number of authors have indicated, price is one of the best measure of 
scarcity insofar as the market embeds many of the issues outlined above (9).  Unfortunately, the 
volatility of price signals makes them poor leading indicators, particularly for technological 
development decisions.  For example, cobalt prices doubled over a period of 4 months; far less 
time than was needed to develop alternative materials and processes. As such, while price will 
ultimately be the trigger that initiates a change in firm strategy it is not satisfactory as a leading 
indicator of risk.  
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3.2 Malthusian metrics 
The outcomes arising from institutional inefficiency in the cobalt case could also have occurred 
from physical constraints (21). In this section and the next, metrics drawn from literature will be 
briefly discussed, but their interpretation will be made through the case study on copper 
availability.  
The direct approach to measuring vulnerability to geophysical limits is to compare how much 
there is with how fast it is being consumed. This is an extension to the type of analysis used by 
Malthus (19). These metrics for scarcity are attempting to balance a notion of the total amount of 
a resource (R) that is available against the rate at which that resource is being consumed (r-dot).  
The typical metric could be N in the following equation (1): 
∫ =⋅− N
o
dtrR 0&                                                                                                                          (1) 
Assuming R and r-dot are constant, N is simply the time to consume the current resource at the 
current rate.  Realistically, none of these terms are ever constants, and assumptions must be made 
to construct more defendable metrics of geophysical limits.  Table 5 presents a set of Malthusian-
inspired metrics from the literature. The metrics are divided into two broad categories (static or 
dynamic) depending on the degree to which they treat the dynamic nature of the many 
interrelated rates in the analysis (see Figure 5). 
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Table 5: Direct measures of physical constraint (Malthusian approaches to scarcity). 
 Metrics Description Source & 
comment 
Static Index 
of Depletion 
based on 
Reserves 
(years) 
 Time to consume reserves at constant consumption 
rate: Reserve/(present consumption rate); 
presents CRsvd /= . Also referred to R/P index. 
Assumptions: consumption rate constant; discovery 
and recycling rates negligible; reserves appropriate 
basis for consideration 
ST
A
TI
C
 
Static Index 
of Depletion 
based on 
Resources 
(years) 
Time to consume resources at constant consumption 
rate: Resource/(present consumption); 
presents CRscd /= . 
Assumptions: consumption rate constant; discovery 
and recycling rates negligible; resources 
(economically recoverable reserves) appropriate basis 
for consideration  
D
Y
N
A
M
IC
 
Exponential 
Index of 
Depletion 
based on 
Reserves 
(years) 
Time to consume reserves at constant exponential 
growth of consumption rate: Reserve/(projected 
consumption), where future consumption can be 
modeled as having exponential growth; 



 += 1ln1
o
e C
Rsvr
r
d , where r is rate of growth 
Assumptions: consumption rate exponential; discovery 
and recycling rates negligible; reserves appropriate 
basis for consideration 
(19,27,28)  
Can be based on 
reserve, reserve 
base, resource or 
resource base. 
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Relative rates 
of discovery 
and 
extraction 
(unitless)  
Ratio of rate of discovery to rate of consumption 
Assumption: rate of increase in discovery smaller than 
rate of increase in extraction/consumption; 
recycling/reuse and substitution negligible; 
improvement in extraction technologies negligible 
(29) 
Time to peak 
production 
(years) 
Time until this forecast peak is reached: based on 
models of future rates.  
Assumption: rate of net consumption (demand less 
substitution) will grow faster than rates of discovery, 
technological improvement and recycling/reuse 
(24,28,30) 
 
The indices of depletion have been used and discussed by many, including (27,28). The static 
index of depletion is an estimate of years to depletion based on the present consumption pattern 
and one of the four estimates of supply (reserve, reserve base, resource, resource base). The 
dynamic index of depletion is a simple extension that includes changing consumption rate, for 
which expected consumption is derived from data for a given historic period and an estimate of 
supply (reserve,…). A material is considered more vulnerable if it has a low index of depletion. 
A major advantage to using the Malthusian approach is its simplicity: depletion is related to how 
fast a non-renewable resource is consumed. Moreover,the metrics can generally be derived from 
readily available historical data. 
Time frame estimates have been made based on 2004 data for a few important metals (cf. Table 
6). Based on the static index, bauxite, iron and cobalt all have time frames greater than 100 years 
before physical constraints become an issue. Copper, gold and lead have much shorter time 
frames and would be expected to be more vulnerable.  
Dynamic indices are based on growth rates, here calculated from USGS data over a 10 year 
period. As Table 13 shows, high exponential growth rates greatly affect the time frame for 
depletion, especially for aluminum and cobalt, whose reserve-based exponential indices are 
under 50 years.   
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Table 6: Static and exponential indices for some metals of interest (12). 
static index (yrs) based on 
 
Reserve 
in 2004 
Reserve 
base in 
2004 Resources 
Primary 
production 
in 2004 reserve 
reserve 
base  resource 
Bauxite 
(aluminum) 2.50E+10 3.20E+10 6.50E+10 1.59E+08 157 201 409 
Cobalt 7.00E+06 1.30E+07 1.50E+07 5.24E+04 134 248 286 
Copper 4.70E+08 9.40E+08 2.30E+09 1.46E+07 32 64 158 
Gold 4.20E+04 9.00E+04 unavailable 2.43E+03 17 37  
Iron ore 8.00E+10 1.80E+11 2.30E+11 7.12E+08 112 253 323 
Lead 6.70E+07 1.40E+08 1.50E+09 3.15E+06 21 44 476 
Zinc 2.20E+08 4.60E+08 1.90E+09 9.60E+06 23 48 198 
 
exponential index (yrs) based on  average growth 
rate from 1994 
to 2004  reserve (yrs) 
 reserve base 
(yrs)  resource (yrs) 
Bauxite 
(aluminum) 4.2% 49 55 70 
Cobalt 12.0% 25 30 31 
Copper 4.4% 20 31 48 
Gold 0.8% 16 33  
Iron ore 0.3% 96 186 222 
Lead 1.3% 19 35 153 
Zinc 2.8% 18 31 68 
 
The above metrics all assume a decreasing supply base for non-renewable resources. However, 
new discoveries, improved technology and increased recycling have contributed to supply 
increases in the past. Taking this into account, one can classify materials with a rate of supply 
growth less than the rate of increasing consumption as vulnerable (19,29). One can also 
incorporate rates into a model to estimate a time to peak production.  Hubbert’s peak for oil was 
one such model (30), which assumed consumption followed a bell curve and that the scarcity 
would occur when growing demand for a given material can no longer be satisfied.  
One criticism of Malthusian metrics is that, since many of the parameters are based on historical 
data, the effect of new technologies that may increase future demand for a metal is not 
considered. For example, future development of fuel cells for alternative energy conversion may 
greatly increase platinum use.    
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Most importantly, the choice of defining supply as the reserve or resource appears random 
without an understanding of the technology and economics of extraction. The differences in 
source are tied to a Ricardian concept – that of varying quality of source.  
3.3 Ricardian metrics 
The main criticism of Malthusian metrics is their assumption of a fixed global supply at constant 
quality for a given material.  Variations in the quality of a source are tied to the level of effort 
required to obtain additional metal. Firms will preferentially consume high quality sources and, 
future availability should decrease with increases in the difficulty of extracting a material. From 
a Ricardian viewpoint, scarcity should occur long before physical exhaustion (6). Ricardian 
metrics of global availability, presented in Table 7, are meant to measure scarcity trends.  
The ore grade is a simple physical measure of the quality of supply (21): in general, the lower the 
ore grade, the more earth will be displaced to access the metal, the more energy will be expended 
to concentrate the mineral, and the more environmental waste will be generated.   
A few metals and typical ore grade ranges are given in Table 8. The ore grades of abundant 
metals, such as iron, aluminum and titanium, are greater than 10%.  Much less abundant 
materials, such as silver and platinum group metals, have ore grades that are fractions of a 
percent.  
The main disadvantage to using ore grade as a metric is that the quality of the supply is not 
entirely captured – for example, an ore body at the surface of the earth’s crust is more accessible 
than one underground. Moreover, ore grade is an imperfect measure of the difficulty of 
extraction – for example, more energy is required to extract aluminum from bauxite than that 
required to extract copper from chalcopyrite. 
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Table 7: Indirect measures of physical constraint: effort metrics, quality of supply metrics (related to 
Ricardian approach to scarcity (20)). 
Metrics Description Source 
Average ore grade 
(%) 
Concentration of metal in a given ore body 
Assumptions: efficient markets in factors and 
capital; technological efficiency; accessibility 
effects negligible 
(21,24) 
Cost ($) Sum of technical costs (machines, fuel, labor, 
etc.), environmental costs, political costs, 
commercial costs (marketing, insurance, stock 
dividends) 
Assumptions: efficient markets in factors and 
capital; technological efficiency 
(6,9,21,31) 
Energy cost (MJ) Energy cost of extraction 
Assumptions: efficient markets in factors and 
capital; technological efficiency 
(9,21) 
Labor and capital 
inputs per unit of 
extractive output 
(unitless) 
Costs based on extraction costs 
Assumptions: efficient markets in factors and 
capital; technological efficiency 
(32) 
Economic Metric:  
Market price ($) 
Relative price, time trend.   
Assumption: efficient markets 
(9,25) 
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Table 8: Typical ore grades and annual 2004 average price for some important metals (33).  
Metal/mineral Ore grade (wt %) Price ($/tonne) 
Magnesium 70-95% MgCO3, brine 3% Mg 3476 
Aluminum 35-50% Al2O3 1848 
Iron 30-65% Fe 338 
Lead 4-8% Pb 884 
Zinc 2-4% Zn 1045 
Copper 0.2-5.0% Cu 2860 
Nickel 1.5% Ni 13,823 
Tin 0.5% Sn 8536 
Cobalt 0.4% Co, byproduct of Cu, Ni, Ag 52,646 
Silver 0.006% Ag, byproduct of gold and base metals 215,088 
Platinum group metals 0.0003-0.002% PGM, byproduct of Ni-sulfide ores 27,288,228 
 
More accurately, the quality of a metal source is related to not only the ore grade, but also the 
difficulty of extraction.  A more direct measure of quality is the cost of extraction because the 
extraction costs for functioning mines is a direct indication of the resources that institutions are 
willing to expend to obtain the metal. Increasing extraction costs indicate the changing nature of 
the available resources and would be expected to correlate with increasing vulnerability 
(6,9,21,31).  
Barriers to using cost as a metric are lack of public data and the subjectivity involved in defining 
the boundaries (i.e. up to which step are costs incorporated?). Due to the difficulty in obtaining 
complete cost data, various reports have focused on energy cost or labor and capital costs (9,21). 
However, these simplifications in cost estimation can weaken the utility of cost as a metric of 
scarcity.  
Metal prices reflect market supply and demand and are sometimes also used for analyzing 
physical constraints. In this context, price is a Ricardian metric since it is bounded on the lower 
end by the cost of extraction and, at the upper end, by the amount institutions are willing to pay. 
Table 8 shows that price generally increases for metals with lower average ore grade.  
In general, though, it can be difficult to distinguish price increases due to physical constraints 
from price increases due to institutional inefficiency (Table 3) such as speculation, temporary 
disruptions (war, strikes), or artificial manipulation of the market by an oligopoly.  Most 
importantly, from a business perspective, reacting only post facto to increasing prices is a poor 
mode of managing risk.   
  
 Page 28  
3.4 Summary of metrics 
Metrics are best used to assess vulnerability rather than predict scarcity since, over the long term, 
market forces and technology will effectively ensure that responses such as substitution and 
recycling will occur. The history of mercury shows how market forces directed continued 
industrial development despite apparent depletion. Using 2004 data, mercury had a static index 
of 179 years based on reserve base values (12), in contrast with a conclusion drawn a mere 32 
years earlier that mercury was already a scarce resource (34). 
However, while these mechanisms may ensure that society as a while will transition through 
changes in materials availability, individual stakeholders within a supply-chain may suffer 
irreparable harm if they are not aware of and able to respond to such changes. While there were 
only short term disruptions in the cobalt case study, it presents a good example of how markets 
and governments can aggravate a situation and change business practices permanently. The 
cobalt case study also demonstrates that limited materials availability can have a real impact on 
supply-chain practices and should be included both operational and technological strategies.  
Firms need to begin considering their options with regards to materials availability, identifying 
their reliance on materials with high vulnerability. The metrics identified in this section should 
be a first step in assessing the vulnerability of a supply chain (Table 9). Identifying materials of 
interest based on metrics for which data is easily obtained would be an efficient starting point. 
Once a material of interest has been identified, further in-depth analysis can begin. The next 
section presents a case study that interprets metrics in the context of the copper supply chain, 
with emphasis on physical constraints, as industrial efficiency was presented in the cobalt case 
study.  
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Table 9: Summary of important categories of metrics. 
Metric Mechanism Advantages Limitations Identified Vulnerabilities 
Structure of 
Supply 
Institutional 
efficiency 
comparative, based 
on historical data 
no future predictions, 
some data difficult to 
obtain 
platinum, 
manganese, tin, 
lithium, copper 
Recycling  Institutional 
efficiency 
simple, includes all 
sources of metal 
recycling rate is not 
comparative; some data is 
difficult to obtain 
zinc, copper 
Malthusian – 
Depletion 
indices 
Physical 
constraint 
simple, comparative, 
based on generally 
available historical 
data 
lacks understanding of 
economic input, does not 
directly consider 
technology 
gold, lead, zinc, 
copper 
Ricardian – 
Effort metrics 
Physical 
constraint 
comparative over 
time, based on 
economic theory 
lacks recycling and 
substitutability analysis, 
some supply-side only 
metrics which assume 
demand-side will follow, 
data difficult to obtain 
 
Economic – 
Price 
Institutional 
efficiency, 
Physical 
constraint  
simple, comparative, 
based on readily 
available historical 
data 
assumes informed market, 
does not separate 
increasing effort and 
improved technology 
iron, aluminum, 
copper, gold, 
nickel, zinc, 
platinum 
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4 Case Study: copper vulnerability to physical constraint 
This section explores the diagnostic utility of the metrics described in Section 3.. Readers should 
note that it is not presently possible to know which measures will best forecast vulnerability to 
geophysical scarcity. Many authors have pointed out that there are no significant examples of 
broad materials scarcity during the modern era and that even detecting indirect evidence of 
scarcity is controversial and ambiguous (chapter 1 of (10), (35)). As such, the approach that will 
be taken here is to examine the consistency of a broad range of indicators — Malthusian and 
Ricardian — in the context of a specific case study — the use of copper — and to discuss the 
implications of these metrics for decision-making by supply-chain decision-makers. 
Because the cobalt case study specifically examines the issues of institutional efficiency, no 
treatment of that will be made here other than to refer readers to Figure 6 and the section above 
on appropriate measures of that form of risk. Several metals, including copper would seem to 
warrant further investigation in this regard and may warrant close monitoring for further 
intensification of these institutional mechanisms of material availability risk. 
4.1 Motivation 
Some of the earliest known metal artifacts, dating from around 7,000 BC, are fashioned out of 
copper (24). Copper’s utility has persisted through the intervening eight millennia. In fact, as was 
shown in Table 6, copper primary production is third highest in terms of annual global tonnage, 
behind only iron and aluminum. Because of its use in applications such as construction, 
telecommunications and electricity among other applications (cf. Figure 7), copper use an 
important indicator of a country’s economic growth and development (Ch.2 (10)).  
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Figure 7: Top copper markets in the U.S. in 2002, total copper consumption 3.33Mt; ACR: air conditioning 
and refrigeration (36). 
However, these levels of consumption also lead to apprehension about copper’s long-term 
availability. Specifically, copper’s static depletion index, based on reserve base, falls is under 75 
years. High economic significance10 and a low depletion index positions copper in an area of 
potential concern compared to other metals11, as shown graphically in Figure 8. These 
                                                 
10 Value, while not a metric of scarcity is an indicator of the global importance of a metal. Value here is defined in 
$/year and is the per tonnage price of the metal * the global primary metal tonnage consumed for a given year (37)
 MMSD In Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development; Earthscan Publications Ltd.: London, UK and 
Sterling, VA, 2002.. 
11 Metals in the graph were selected to include top 10 highest tonnage of primary produced yearly metals and top 10 
highest annual value (price * tonnage) metals as mentioned in ch.2: (37) MMSD In Mining, Minerals and 
Sustainable Development; Earthscan Publications Ltd.: London, UK and Sterling, VA, 2002. 
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characteristics make Cu a relevant case study into the risk of physical constraint to the supply 
chain.12  
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Figure 8: Positioning of metals: Malthusian static index of depletion base on reserves and global value of 
primary metric (12). Metals of increasing concern have high value and low depletion index. 
 
4.2 Understanding copper vulnerability using metrics 
Physical constraint of copper, or any non-renewable resource, depends in large part on the 
drivers of availability: consumption rate, recycling rate, etc. Unfortunately, due to the 
interdependence of these issues and the fundamental uncertainty of prediction, it is impossible to 
                                                 
12 Copper availability has also been for the subject of case studies in a few published articles and books looking 
sustainable development. Interested readers may want to consult: ((38) Lifset, R. J.; Gordon, R. B.; Graedel, T. E.; 
Spatari, S.; Bertram, M. Jom-Journal of the Minerals Metals & Materials Society 2002, 54, 21-26.), ((24) Ayres, 
R. U.; Ayres, L.; Råde, I. The life cycle of copper, its co-products and byproducts; Kluwer Academic: Dordrecht ; 
Boston, 2003.) and ((39) Reijnders, L. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 2003, 38, 59-66.). 
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measure these drivers directly or with great precision. Nevertheless, decisions must be made. In 
light of that, this section proceeds by examining (1) a simple, imperfect screening metric, (2) the 
criteria for action on that metric, and (3) the use of more detailed measures for additional insight 
on risk. 
4.2.1 Screening for Scarcity Vulnerability: The Static Depletion Index 
The simplest way to screen for scarcity-based material vulnerability is to use static depletion 
times. Depletion indices based on different measures of geological source — reserve, reserve 
base, resource and resource base — will be discussed in this section recognizing that the 
differences among the various measures of source derive from the varying quality of the sources.  
Table 10 row 1 shows these screening measures for copper at 2004 consumption rates. Most 
striking, basing the measure on reserves, the amount of copper available for economic extraction 
is only sufficient to last 32 years (cf. row 1 of Table 10). This low value contrasts strikingly with 
those of aluminum and iron, both of which have more than 100 years to depletion at 2004 
consumption values (Figure 8). 
At the other end of the spectrum, the static depletion index based on resource base is one 
hundred million years. This indicates that the amount of copper in the earth’s crust is so great 
that any concern for depletion of primary stocks lies in the distant future. However, recall that 
the resource base incorporates minerals of very poor quality, such that complete extraction would 
require a prohibitively large energy, capital, environmental and land cost, even in the very long 
term.   
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Table 10: Malthusian metrics: depletion lifetime estimates for copper based on 2004 data. 
Reserve13 Reserve Base Resource 
Resource 
Base14 Primary Metal 
Years to Depletion 
based on: 470,000kt 940,000kt 
1,600,000kt 
(land) + 
700,000kt (sea) 
1.5x1012kt 
Static Index: Primary 
Production in 2004 = 
14,600kt 
32.2 64.4 158 1.03x108 
Exponential Index: Primary 
production * average growth 
from 1969 to 2004 = 
14,600kt x 2.5% 
23.9 38.8 64.7 598 
 
The most conservative static estimate of 32 years to depletion, based on reserve size, is 
indicative of the time frame within which new technologies for extraction or new sources must 
be found in order to continue the present yearly consumption under present economic conditions. 
Otherwise, changes in economic or technological conditions (increased prices, decreased costs) 
will occur to reflect the tapping of the reserve base, whose static index is 64 years. Another 
possible interpretation is that the depletion estimate based on reserve is the time frame within 
which improved conservation and increased copper substitution will result in decreased copper 
consumption.  
The static depletion time frame estimated based on resource is more than 100 years, greater 
than the time frame businesses or policy makers need to consider when planning future materials 
strategies (35). Because the resource size includes inferred copper ores, it embeds a measure of 
uncertainty. Increased spending on exploration can reduce the uncertainty such that previously 
inferred ores become determined and can be considered part of the reserves or reserve base. 
Improved extraction technologies in the future can make previously uneconomic extraction 
economic. Thus, the estimate based on resource, which assumes that most of the resource can 
some day be economically accessible, is not unreasonable. 
                                                 
13 Values of reserve, reserve base, resource and primary production are from USGS Copper Mineral Yearbook 2005 
(12) U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Department of the Interior, 1932-2006. 
14 Value of resource base is from (27) CRU International Ltd. In Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 
Development; International Institute for Environment and Development: London, UK, 2002; p 221. 
  
 Page 35  
4.2.1.1 Limits for concern 
The measures based on reserve, reserve base and resource are considered more informative to 
supply chain stakeholders, as they better reflect time-frames during which supply-chain decision-
makers have the opportunity to act.  Nevertheless, the first question that arises concerning the 
static depletion indices for copper is whether the values indicate time horizons of concern.  In 
other words, how small a value warrants action? Unfortunately, the real answer to that question 
derives from the complex interaction of the characteristics of existing deposits, the discovery of 
unknown resources, the evolution of future demand as well as extraction and production 
technology, the ability and success of secondary materials recovery, and changes in cost, price 
and the elasticity of substitution for the material at hand. The development of such models is the 
subject of active research, but is currently only undertaken for the most valuable of global 
resources – typically energy resources.  
Nevertheless, non-fuel mineral supply-chains must make decisions about when to allocate 
resources to mitigate material price risks. For this purpose, the authors would propose, an 
inferential strategy for evaluating the gravity of depletion index screens. In particular, the 
reserve-based screen should be compared against industry rules of thumb for reserve capacity. 
Several authors have examined the issues that drive reserve management decisions, particularly 
exploration and technology development (18,21). Although there is variation in their analyses, 
all point to a figure of about 30 years for the magnitude of the managed reserve life compared to 
current consumption. Accumulating stocks beyond that level, generally, does not provide 
significant discounted revenue to offset the costs of exploration and the vagaries of market 
evolution. Thus, 30 years may serve as a threshold indicator for concern; greater values would 
represent conditions where the primary industry is unmotivated to address geophysical scarcity, 
while values around or below 30 years would indicate a need for further evaluation.  
Based on this criterion, copper, with a static depletion index of 32 years, sits on the border of 
concern, leaving the question as to whether further or more intensive investigation is warranted. 
In an analysis of oil reserves, Pindyck’s modeling results showed significant price increases 
shortly before any reduction in the R/P (40). In light of this, current information would suggest 
that strategic decision-makers should pay careful attention to resources whose economic 
availability sits in this region.  
In light of this result, further investigation into the nature of the risk within the copper supply 
chain seems prudent. The following section to will do so by applying the dynamic Malthusian 
and Ricardian measures described previously. 
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4.2.2 Further Investigation into Supply-Chain Risk: Dynamic and Ricardian Measures 
4.2.2.1 Dynamic Depletion Index 
Since applications that require copper are key to modern industrialization, copper consumption 
over the past century has continuously increased and is expected to continue increasing as 
countries in developing East Asia and eventually other parts of the world continue to 
industrialize. In fact, based on data from (16), covering years 1969-2004, one finds that total 
copper consumption from primary and secondary sources has increased exponentially 
(R2=0.9643), with ba total increase of 124% and an average growth rate of 2.3% (cf. Figure 9). 
Moreover, primary consumption has also grown exponentially during this period (R2=0.9567) 
with an average growth rate of 2.5%.  
Extrapolating these consumption growth rates, dynamic measures of depletion time estimate 
significant depletion within the next century  (cf. row 2 of Table 10).  
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Figure 9: Global copper consumption trends 1969-2005 (16). 
4.2.2.2 The Nature of The Available Resource 
Malthus’ dismal statement regarding food and population growth was made based on the 
dynamic analysis that population appeared to be growing at a faster rate than the capacity to 
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produce food. In the case of copper, concern about consumption trends would be reduced if 
exploration and recycling rates seemed to match the rate of consumption growth. 
Although consumption has been growing exponentially, primary copper producers have, in part 
through exploration, been able to increase size of reserves (cf. Figure 10). For the past decade,  
reserve/consumption ratios have sat at the border of concern at slightly above thirty years (cf. 
Figure 11). 
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Figure 10: Historical estimates of reserve and reserve base (12). 
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Figure 11: Change over time of estimate of future depletion year based on static index of copper reserve (12). 
Changes in static index estimate (number of years to depletion). 
4.2.2.3 Ricardian measures 
Technological improvements have also made it economically feasible to exploit lower grade 
ores, increasing reserve size and postponing depletion. Between 1970 and 1993, when US copper 
grade remained a relatively constant 0.5%, the costs of western world copper mining decreased, 
illustrating the effect of improving technologies (cf. Figure 12) (24,31). Copper prices, which 
depend in part on costs, also somewhat decreased over the same period of time. 
However, overall world cumulative primary consumption since 1770 has been increasing faster 
than the rate of discovery (29). Moreover, copper ore grade, which is an indicator of the ease of 
extraction, has decreased for the U.S. since 1980 (24). In fact, Ayres has shown that, from 1880 
to 1970, average copper ore grades for the U.S. dropped from 3% to 0.5%, plateauing at 0.5% 
copper from 1970 to 2000. 
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Figure 12: Weighted-average adjusted breakeven costs of producing refined copper metal from primary and 
prices for the western world for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1993. Costs do not include capital costs. 
Price is US domestic producer price. Values have been adjusted to real 1990 US dollars. Source: (31). 
4.2.2.4 The Availability of Substitutes 
Once primary production peaks, secondary production will be the key to preventing significant 
drops in copper consumption. Analysis of recycling is more difficult, mainly because 
information for many metals is not publicly available and, in some cases, can vary widely 
between sources. In 1994, the world recycling rate was estimated to be 22.5% or 39%, depending 
on the reference source ((41) and (16), respectively). World recycling of end-of life copper (old 
scrap) was estimated based on materials flow analysis (MFA) and accounted for only 17.5% of 
total consumption (41). According to Graedel et al., copper availability in 1994 was limited to 
26.7% of global copper consumption. One reason for low availability is that copper products 
have lifetimes of 10 to 45 years, so much of the copper that has been consumed in the past few 
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decades is still in use, with more being added yearly to the global infrastructure than being 
discarded15 .  
Table 11: Copper recycling metrics, based on Graedel 1994 Copper Cycle Flow Diagram. Note: reference 
Jolly 2005 estimated 1994 recycling rate at 39%. 
Recycling Rate 22.5% 
Old Scrap Recycling Rate 17.5% 
Old Scrap Availability 26.7% 
Recycling Efficiency 65.6% 
 
Based on the data from Jolly 2005, secondary consumption from 1969-2004 did increase overall, 
with old and new scrap combined accounting for between 27% and 41% of yearly copper 
consumption (= recycling rate). However, the overall secondary growth rate was not exponential 
and the recycling rate did not show any growth. These results indicate that world growth of 
copper consumption depended heavily on world growth of mine production capacity, rather than 
recycling increases. 
4.2.2.5 Modeling Scarcity 
Further understanding of copper availability would involve building a model to measure some of 
the other metrics that have still not been covered in this analysis: time to peak production and 
secondary availability.  
In the case of copper, a few types of models have been prepared. The concept of peak production 
is central to the debate on the future of oil, with the Department of Energy (DOE) predicting 
peak production in 2037 (42). For copper, one estimate for peak production gives a 15 year time 
frame before copper primary production will no longer be able to continue increasing (24). 
The risk of copper disruption is significantly greater than for iron and aluminum, and it has been 
at a historical high for the past decade.  From the simplest metrics based on static measures of 
depletion to more complex metrics based on modeling, indications of copper vulnerability 
reinforce the need for firms to adapt to the risk of possible future material disruptions.  
                                                 
15Copper in infrastructure is defined as copper that is being used in products such as the copper piping in houses that 
are still standing, or copper in cars that are still being driven. The Use phase identifies 7,800Gg (1Gg = 1kt) of 
copper that was added to the global infrastructure in 1994. 
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4.3 Understanding supply chain roles in addressing copper vulnerability 
What businesses should take from the above analysis is that, while the complete depletion of 
copper is not imminent, access to the available body of primary resources will require changes. 
Given rules of thumb of reserve management, a proactive business that depends upon the 
materials that derive from those reserves will understand that there are actions that they can take 
and that should be considered to mitigate these changes. Upstream and downstream supply chain 
stakeholders will have different roles to play in reducing the vulnerability of any material 
system. 
Upstream supply chain stakeholders are well aware of their effect on copper supply. For 
example, each year, actions taken to increase the size of reserves include: 
1. exploration to find new reserves 
2. technology improvements to decrease costs of extraction, and 
3. technology improvements to increase copper yield from extraction processes 
Upstream supply chains have worked towards reducing copper vulnerability by increasing 
spending on copper exploration from 340M$ to 825M$ between 2003 to 2005 ((12) 2004 
exploration summary, (43)). These types of efforts have led to a 460% growth of copper reserves 
since 1930, despite the exponential growth in primary consumption. 
Downstream supply chains also need to address copper vulnerability and should not take comfort 
that upstream supply chains will ensure continued supply. Businesses that do not prepare 
themselves for upstream materials disruptions and price increases can become uncompetitive as 
new, lower cost technologies or materials replace copper. One option to reduce vulnerability is to 
forestall scarcity. Large consumption growth rates accompanied by low recovery rates greatly 
increases the risks of scarcity. Therefore, downstream efforts to defer scarcity should involve: 
1. technological improvements to increase efficiency 
2. technological discoveries to substitute copper for lower cost/lower vulnerability 
materials, and 
3. increased recycling – both at the manufacturing and end-of-life stages 
In certain cases, these actions may already have been taken to satisfy business efficiency.     
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4.4 Improving resilience towards copper vulnerability  
In 2002, the price of copper began to increase. By May 2006, copper prices rose above 7000$/t, 
the highest they have been in real dollars since World War I and nearly two times the 20th 
century average in real dollars. Short-term supply and demand misalignments, due to China’s 
recent growth, and the inability of copper producers to ramp up production quickly enough  have 
explained these recent price increases (44,45). Production limitations have been linked to labor 
strikes and natural phenomena.  
These price trends suggest that copper has become more vulnerable, mostly from an institutional 
efficiency aspect. However, according to Chapman and Roberts, a long term trend of physical 
constraint could manifest as a series of supply disruptions (21).  For  example, responding to 
spikes in demand for copper may be more difficult when reserve levels are low. The present 
supply-demand misalignments could therefore be viewed as reinforcing the above analysis of 
metrics, emphasizing the need for firms to become resilient to a copper geophysical constraint. 
A resilient supply chain should have a strategy that includes “what-if” plans for unplanned 
disruptions (46). The cobalt case-study suggests that a strategy for downstream supply chains 
should involve securing alternative material supplies (ex: increased recycling), and planning for 
materials substitution.  
To secure copper supplies, supply chains need to have updated and accurate source information. 
Secondary copper information may be particularly difficult to obtain.  
In the case of copper, relatively easy and secure substitutions have been developed in most major  
applications. Aluminum can substitute for copper in electrical wiring and heating/cooling 
systems, since aluminum supplies are abundant (reserve base/consumption > 250 years). In  
plumbing applications, plastic pipes can substitute for copper. In telecommunication, fiber optics 
and wireless networks can replace copper. Substitution is expected to occur in the areas where 
technology and price make it most advantageous. 
Finally, all the trends showing copper’s increased vulnerability deserve continued close 
monitoring. Although we will not run out of copper, the copper supply is vulnerable to demand 
volatility. 
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5 Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
This document has presented two detailed cases that together highlight the interplay of raw 
materials availability and the supply chain. In particular, these have suggested:  
1. Outcomes: specific changes which can be expected when limitations emerge;  
2. Mechanisms: two mechanisms that can drive such limitations; and  
3. Metrics: quantitative measures to provide insight on vulnerability.  
This section will complement this with a preliminary discussion of prescriptions to make supply 
chains less vulnerable to such perturbations.  
Those stakeholders that operate upstream are well aware of the capricious nature of raw 
materials and their impact on firm success. The cobalt case study illustrated that limitations in 
materials availability affected activities throughout the supply chain. Although changes in cobalt 
price emerged due to institutional-inefficiency, and were therefore temporary, materials 
substitutions and changes in mining and refining location remain.  
Specifically, this paper suggests a range of outcomes that can be expected in response to 
availability-driven price increases. These include:  
• technological: materials substitution can reduce demand for scarce materials ; 
• technological: process change can improve conversion from resource to product 
• geographic: mining exploration and source relocation can increase availability and 
reduce vulnerability; 
• operational: transportation modes improve source access and lead times; 
• operational: increased inventory can reduce vulnerability to access and price uncertainty; 
• operational: development of a reverse supply chain can provide access to resources 
Given the breadth of these effects, supply chain managers need to analyze the risks of materials 
availability changes and prepare for possible future problems. A preliminary framework for 
approaching this issue was developed in this report. Metrics were developed based on the 
literature and the case study of cobalt to screen for vulnerable materials sources. No single metric 
is without its limitations; it is advised that a combination of metrics should be considered as a 
first step for firms to identify potential issues. 
5.1 Supply Chain Prescriptions 
Dealing with risk and uncertainty is not new to supply chain managers. In fact, two areas of work 
exist which deal with these risks; the first deals with supply-demand coordination (47-49); the 
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second deals with disruption (46,50-52).  Materials scarcity, as defined here, relates mainly to 
disruption risk. 
Increased awareness of the availability of all raw materials may be facilitated by using metrics. 
Along the supply chain, upstream stakeholders are the most pertinent source of accurate 
information; limiting the risk of speculation, unexpected price changes and the permanent 
changes that they can engender. Knowledge of government action, in particular for defense 
applications, can also be critical, as shown in the cobalt case.  
Highlighting vulnerabilities through increased awareness is the first step towards investing in a 
plan to reduce vulnerability and deal with future disruptions. It is insufficient to list substitution 
as a future plan, rather, material selection decision-making should span the whole organization, 
affecting procurement, finances, marketing and manufacturing. In preparing for materials 
scarcity, this plan should include alternate sources of materials and should evaluate materials 
substitution options.  
Another strategy is to add flexibility to the supply chain by having multiple suppliers and  
keeping inventory stocks (46,50). In the case of materials, flexibility can also be added through 
substitution and recycling. Supply chain managers should be aware of possible substitutes, their 
attributes and required changes to make the substitution successful. Second, recycling can be an 
important alternative source of materials, but technological limitations to recycling do exist. It is 
important for supply chain managers to be aware of recycling possibilities and barriers for their 
products. 
Knowledge, planning, and flexibility are three broad measures to reducing supply chain risks. 
Although, institutional inefficiency is the most likely type of materials availability problem for 
the supply chain in the near term, each of these measures can also prepare supply chains for long 
term risks of physical constraint.   
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